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I. INTRODUCTION
Elliot Rodger viewed Friday, May 24, 2014, as his “day of retribution” as
he embarked on a violent killing spree throughout the streets of California.1
Rodger’s massacre left a total of seven victims dead, including himself, on
the streets neighboring the University of California, Santa Barbara campus.2
Rodger executed his premeditated, meticulous mass murder with three semiautomatic handguns, accompanied by 400 rounds of ammunition — all of
which he legally purchased and registered.3
As a child, Rodger participated in therapy and received psychiatric drug
treatment; however, at the age of 18, Rodger refused continued mental
healthcare.4 Professionals agree that Rodger displayed warning signs
1. See Kimberly Kindy, Father of Victim in Santa Barbara Shootings to
Politicians: ‘I Don’t Care About Your Sympathy, WASH. POST (May 27, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/father-of-victim-in-santa-barbara-shootingsto-politicians-i-dont-care-about-your-sympathy/2014/05/27/8a030d10-e5ad-11e3-a86b362fd5443d19_story.html (detailing how Rodger stabbed and shot his victims).
2. Ralph Ellis & Sara Sidner, Deadly California Rampage: Chilling Video, but No
Match
for
Reality,
CNN
(May
27,
2014),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/24/justice/california-shooting-deaths/ (stating that Rodger
killed seven, including himself, and injured thirteen others).
3. See id.
4. L.A. Times Staff Writers, Isla Vista Attacker’s Struggles Didn’t Prevent Gun
Buying, L.A. TIMES (May 26, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-in-isla-
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indicating he harbored violent tendencies.5 For example, in Rodger’s 137page manifesto, “My Twisted World,” he documented his violent
propensities including his attempt to push people off of a ledge at a college
party.6 In April 2014, after discovering her son’s disturbing YouTube
videos, Rodger’s mother tried to intervene by alerting his former therapist.7
In response, the therapist reported the incident to the Santa Barbara mental
health hotline, which dispatched police officers to follow up with Rodger.8
Rodger admitted to the police officers that he had difficulties socializing with
his classmates and peers, yet the police determined that his calm, lucid
behavior did not meet the criteria for an involuntary hold.9 If the officers
had searched Rodger’s home they would have uncovered three semiautomatic handguns, 400 rounds of ammunition, and his 137-page manifesto
plotting his “day of retribution.”10 However, because Rodger maintained a
clean record and did not meet the criteria for an involuntary commitment for
mental health treatment, California law did not allow police to intervene or
remove firearms.11 Further, even if police believed Rodger truly posed a
threat to himself or others, California law did not permit police to intervene.12
In response to Rodger’s mass shooting, California politicians recognized
vista-shooting-suspects-struggle-didnt-prevent-gun-buying-20140526.html
(emphasizing that he was in a phase of pre-psychosis).
5. See Phillip Rucker & Robert Costa, In Elliot Rodger, Authorities in California
Saw Warning Signs but Didn’t See a Tipping Point, WASH. POST (May 25, 2014),
http://washingtonpost.com national/sheriff-calif-shooter-rodger-flew-under-the-radarwhen-deputies-visited-him-in-april/2014/05/25/88123026-e3b4-11e38dccd6b7fede081a_story.html.
6. See id. (detailing Rodger’s violent episodes where he targeted girls whom
Rodger wanted to “punish” for not talking to him).
7. Caroline Bankoff, UCSB Shooter’s Parents Tried to Stop Him, N.Y. MAG. (May
26, 2014), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/05/ucsb-shooters-parents-tried-tostop-him.html (explaining that Rodger’s mother noticed and sought to prevent her son’s
erratic behavior).
8. See id. (emphasizing Rodger participated in therapy on-and-off since he was
eight years old; in high school, Rodger saw a therapist every day).
9. See id. (stressing that under California law police officers lacked grounds for a
search because they classified Rodger as normal).
10. Rucker & Costa, supra note 5 (asserting officers would have found Rodger’s
manifesto detailing his disturbed thoughts).
11. See J.B. Wogan, After Isla Vista, Lawmakers Want to Take Guns from
Dangerous
People,
GOVERNING
(June
6,
2014),
http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-bill-would-allow-police-toseize-guns-from-dangerous-people.html (stressing California law is flawed because it
did not allow police to remove Rodger’s firearms).
12. Id. (proposing how Assembly Bill 1014 would attempt to repair the flaw in
California law).
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the problems with California gun laws; particularly, Assemblywoman Nancy
Skinner affirmed that the Santa Barbara mass shooting illuminated the
problems with California’s mental health laws, but more importantly, with
the state’s gun laws.13 Rodger’s massacre prompted California lawmakers
to create Assembly Bill 1014, which allows police to temporarily seize guns
from people who pose a threat to themselves or others.14
This Comment argues that Assembly Bill 1014 does not infringe on an
individual’s Second Amendment constitutional right to bear arms because
the bill is narrowly tailored to prevent gun violence as it targets only
dangerous individuals.15 Part II discusses Assembly Bill 1014 and
summarizes the basic principles of Second Amendment jurisprudence.16 Part
III argues that since the Supreme Court has not yet established an appropriate
standard for Second Amendment analysis, courts should use First
Amendment jurisprudence as guidance in determining the appropriate level
of scrutiny to employ when analyzing Second Amendment claims.17 Part III
explains how Assembly Bill 1014 survives the requisite intermediate
scrutiny analysis and further survives strict scrutiny – the highest level of
scrutiny applied by the courts.18 Part IV recommends that other states should
consider the impact of gun violence by passing legislation similar to
California’s Assembly Bill 1014.19 Part V concludes by reiterating that
California’s Assembly Bill 1014 is constitutional because it survives both
intermediate and strict scrutiny.20

13. Melanie Mason, Lawmakers Seek ‘Gun Violence Restraining Order’ After
UCSB Slayings, L.A. TIMES (May 27, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/political/lame-pc-gun-violence-restraining-order-20140527-story.html
(highlighting
that
legislation surfaced in response to the Santa Barbara shooting).
14. See Wogan, supra note 11 (noting when people are in a psychological crisis,
those closest can best spot warning signs).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
16. See infra Part II (discussing the Second Amendment’s historical jurisprudence
and its applicability, using First Amendment framework, to California’s Assembly Bill
1014).
17. See infra Part III (analogizing the First Amendment framework with the Second
Amendment, using a one-size-fits-all analysis, arguing that Assembly Bill 1014 passes
intermediate scrutiny).
18. See infra Part III (arguing that when applying the First Amendment scrutiny
framework, Assembly Bill 1014 survives both intermediate and strict scrutiny).
19. See infra Part IV (discussing that in response to our nation’s recent mass
shooting trend, other states should adopt gun violence restraining orders and firearm
seizure warrants similar to California’s Assembly Bill 1014).
20. See infra Part V (arguing that extrapolating the First Amendment framework,
Assembly Bill 1014 is constitutional under the Second Amendment).
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II. BACKGROUND

A. The Triggering Factors of Assembly Bill 1014.
Assembly Bill 1014 creates a procedure for family members to obtain a
restraining order and firearm seizure warrant against an individual who poses
significant injury to themselves or others by possessing a firearm.21 A gun
violence restraining order prohibits an individual from having in his or her
custody or control, owning, purchasing, or possessing any firearm or
ammunition.22 A firearm seizure warrant orders a restrained person to
surrender to local law enforcement all firearms or ammunition in his or her
custody.23
In particular, an immediate family member may submit an ex parte request
to the court setting forth the facts and circumstances convincing the court
that a gun violence restraining order shall be issued.24 Whether the grounds
exist to grant a gun violence restraining order will turn on many factors
including: recent threats or acts of violence, reckless use or display of
firearms, and history of use, attempted use, or threat of force against others.25
If a magistrate judge finds probable cause to believe the named person poses
a threat, the magistrate will issue a gun violence restraining order.26 Further,
if the individual has current control or custody of firearms, then the
magistrate may also issue a firearm seizure warrant.27
After issuing a gun violence restraining order, the court will hold a hearing
to determine whether the individual may buy or possess firearms.28 During
the hearing, the State must present clear and convincing evidence that the
named person poses a significant risk of personal injury to themselves or

21. A.B 1014, Gen. Assemb., 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) emphasizing that
to ensure an individual’s due process right, an individual is entitled to a hearing to
determine whether a person may own or possess a firearm).
22. See id. (detailing the renewal process of the order for additional one-year periods
and hearing process to terminate the order).
23. See id. (explaining how the local law enforcement agency must retain custody
of the firearm and/or ammunition for the duration of a gun violence restraining order).
24. See id. (stressing an affidavit should set forth the credible facts of violent
behavior or a violent history in order to establish the restraining order’s probable cause).
25. See id. (considering recent violations of any protective orders and prior arrests
for felony offenses).
26. Id. (stating whether a magistrate issues a firearm seizure warrant is at the
magistrate’s complete discretion based on the facts established by the government).
27. Id. (explaining that a seizure warrant requires that a police officer seize any
specified firearms the dangerous individual owns or possesses).
28. See id. (detailing the hearing must be scheduled no later than twenty-one days
after the firearm seizure).
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others by owning or possessing the firearm.29 If such risks are proven,
Assembly Bill 1014 requires law enforcement to retain any firearms for a
period of up to one year.30 Further, Assembly Bill 1014 would prohibit the
restrained individual from owning, possessing, receiving or attempting to
receive a firearm.31 Assembly Bill 1014 would authorize, upon probable
cause, either a law enforcement agency or judge to file a motion to request a
gun violence restraining order renewal.32 Since Assembly Bill 1014 involves
firearm restrictions, its constitutionality under the Second Amendment will
undoubtedly be questioned.33
B. Establishing the Second Amendment Baseline: District of Columbia v.
Heller.
The Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to bear arms.34
More specifically, courts recognize that at the core of the Second
Amendment is the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to bear firearms
in the home for self-defense.35 In 2008, the Supreme Court struck down the
District of Columbia’s ban on the possession of handguns in District of
Columbia v. Heller.36 For the first time, the Supreme Court analyzed the
Second Amendment’s protections, scope, and limitations.37 The Court began
by analyzing the Second Amendment’s Operative Clause that codifies a
29. Id. (stressing that the state carries the burden of proof).
30. See id. (explaining that an individual found as a significant risk of injury may

file a written appeal).
31. Id. (noting that the total time of the firearm restraint should also not exceed one
year, however, can be renewed).
32. See id. (underlining that only with probable cause to believe that a person
continues to pose a significant risk of personal injury to him, herself or others will a
judge grant this motion).
33. See id. (acknowledging critics will attack the Bill’s constitutionality under
Heller); Patrick McGreevy, Governor Oks Temporary Gun Seizures from People Judged
to be a Danger, L.A. Times (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/political/lame-pc-california-jerry-brown-gun-seizures-20140929-story.html (“Without a doubt, AB
1014 is one of the most egregious violations of civil liberties ever introduced in the
California Legislature.”).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
35. See United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that
Heller established the core of the Second Amendment as a citizen’s right to use arms in
defense of hearth and home).
36. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (holding that the
District of Columbia’s blanket ban on handgun possession prohibits law-abiding citizens
from lawfully possessing a firearm in the home for the purpose of immediate selfdefense).
37. See id. (establishing the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to
keep and bear arms for the core lawful purpose of self-defense).
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“right of the people,” stressing that this right belongs to all Americans.38 The
Court analyzed the expansive meaning behind “the right to keep and bear
Arms.”39 Additionally, the Court, while analogizing it to the First
Amendment, held that the Second Amendment extends to all arms, even
those not in existence at the time of the Second Amendment’s founding. 40
After piecing together the textual elements of the Operative Clause, the Court
found that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual the “right to
possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”41
Indeed, the Second Amendment confers an individual the right to bear
arms; however, courts recognize that this right is not unlimited.42
Particularly, the Second Amendment does not extend to all citizens the right
to carry arms for any manner or purpose.43 The Court cautioned that though
the Second Amendment confers a right to bear arms, nothing about the
Court’s opinion should cast doubt on the long-standing prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,44 or laws forbidding
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings.45
In Heller, the Court struck down the gun ban in the District of Columbia
after emphasizing the Second Amendment’s inherent right of self-defense in
the home.46
Unlike most jurisprudence analyzing an individual’s
fundamental right, the Court did not employ a specific level of scrutiny in
establishing the law’s constitutionality.47 The Court, however, established
38. See id. at 579-81.
39. Id. at 581 (noting the phrase applies to weapons not specifically designed for

military use and capacity).
40. Id. at 582 (comparing the Second and Fourth Amendment, stating just as the
Fourth Amendment protects modern forms of search, the Second Amendment applies to
any and all instruments that constitute bearable arms).
41. Id. at 592 (noting that the meaning of the Second Amendment is strongly
supported by the amendment’s historical background).
42. See Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 2013) (drawing the
parallel between the First and Second Amendment noting though the right is protective,
not unlimited).
43. Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (stressing the Second Amendment does not allow
citizens the right to carry arms for any confrontation).
44. Jana R. McCreary, “Mentally Defective” Language in the Gun Control Act, 45
CONN. L. REV. 813, 853 (2013) (noting the Heller Court correctly limits the right to bear
arms from the mentally ill).
45. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (noting the Court did not invalidate many of the
longstanding state and federal prohibitions on firearm possession).
46. See id. at 628 (establishing that the ban impinges on an individual’s inherent
right of self-defense by banning an entire class of arms that society uses for lawful
purposes).
47. Id. at 628-29. (noting the Court did not specify a level of scrutiny because under
any level of scrutiny a complete ban of handguns from the home would fail constitutional
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that courts going forward could not analyze the Second Amendment under a
rational basis review because the low burden would render the Second
Amendment ineffective.48 Though the Court rejected the rational basis test,
the Court neither established, nor hinted, at how future courts should review
Second Amendment claims.49 Instead, the Court held that under either strict
or intermediate scrutiny, the complete ban of handguns – the most preferred
firearm – in the home, would fail any constitutional analysis.50 In effect, the
Court held the Second Amendment rises above any interests in a lawabiding, responsible citizen’s right to use arms in defense of “hearth and
home.”51 Thus, the Court concluded that the District of Columbia’s ban on
handgun possession violated the Second Amendment because it prohibited
law-abiding citizens from possessing any lawful firearm in the home for the
purpose of self-defense.52
C. Analyzing the Constitutionality of City and State Ordinances Under the
Second Amendment.
Although the Court in Heller established a list of long-standing firearm
regulations that did not infringe on a person’s Second Amendment right, the
Court did not establish how future courts should review Second Amendment
claims.53 When determining the level of scrutiny to use in Second
Amendment jurisprudence, most courts analogize to the First Amendment.54
Particularly, the court in United States v. Chovan looked to the First
muster).
48. See id. at 628 n.27 (explaining that if all that was required to overcome the right
to bear arms was rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant and have
no effect).
49. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 676 (4th Cir. 2010) (asserting the
Heller court did not establish the proper level of scrutiny because the ban would fail
under any constitutional muster).
50. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29 (noting that the District of Columbia’s ban
disables individuals to protect one’s home and family and such would be unconstitutional
under any standards of scrutiny that we have applied to other constitutional rights).
51. Id. at 635; see also United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 92 (3d Cir. 2010)
(noting the Amendment must protect the right of law-abiding citizens to own guns for
lawful purposes).
52. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (stressing the right to self-defense in an individual’s
home is at the core, a law-abiding citizen’s Second Amendment right).
53. See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 467 (4th Cir. 2011) (concluding
McDonald established self-defense as fundamental and as the central component of the
individual right to bear arms); see also United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1137
(9th Cir. 2013) (noting the Heller court did determine that rational basis review would
render the Second Amendment redundant, and thus inappropriate for Second
Amendment analysis).
54. See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138.
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Amendment when analyzing a law that prohibited domestic violence
misdemeanants and held that the degree of judicial scrutiny depends on the
degree of burden placed on the fundamental right.55 Further, the court in
United States v. Marzzarella also used the First Amendment’s framework to
decide whether a Second Amendment claim should be analyzed under strict
or intermediate scrutiny.56
Additionally, courts analyzing the Second Amendment can follow the
court’s analysis in Ezell v. City of Chicago by extrapolating the First
Amendment framework.57 Using the framework, courts should conclude
that a severe burden on the Second Amendment will require a “strong public
interest justification” while activity and laws merely regulating gun
possession, rather than restricting, may be more easily justified.58 As
illustrated in Chovan and Marzzarella, courts may look towards the First
Amendment jurisprudence and employ either strict or intermediate scrutiny
to a Second Amendment claim.59
1. Intermediate Scrutiny
When a statute’s place and manner restrictions serve a governmental
interest and do not substantially burden the right to possess a firearm for selfdefense, courts will review the Second Amendment claim under intermediate
scrutiny.60 For example, when analyzing the law banning gun possession for
domestic violence misdemeanants, the court in United States v. Chester
stated when applying intermediate scrutiny that: (1) the government’s
objective must be important, and (2) there must be a reasonable fit between
the regulation and the asserted objective.61 The court in United States v.

55. Id. (stating that along with the burden, courts sometimes look towards the
specific iteration of the right).
56. See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 96 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining
while analyzing the constitutionality of a ban of firearms with destroyed serial numbers,
the court declared that courts should apply the First Amendment framework to Second
Amendment claims).
57. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011) (analogizing the
First Amendment to the Second Amendment, stating time, place, and manner restrictions
need only be reasonable and justified).
58. See id.
59. See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138 (noting that similar to the First Amendment
context, the level of scrutiny in the Second Amendment context should depend on the
nature of the conduct being regulated and to the degree which the challenged law burdens
the right); see also Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97-98 (extrapolating the First Amendment
framework).
60. See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1139 (recognizing the law may not significantly impair
an individual’s right of firearm possession in the home).
61. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010) (stating the
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Masciandro noted that a law does not need to be the least intrusive means of
achieving the government objective.62
The court in Chester applied intermediate scrutiny to a West Virginia law
that banned domestic violence misdemeanants from possessing firearms and
justified the use of intermediate scrutiny since the ban served the interest of
restraining non-law-abiding citizens’ gun possession.63 Similarly, the court
in United States v. Skoien applied the same analysis as the Chester court to
a domestic violent misdemeanant.64
2. Strict Scrutiny
Courts review Second Amendment claims under strict scrutiny only when
a restriction imposes a substantial burden on the ability of a law-abiding
citizen to possess a firearm for self-defense.65 The court in Chovan explained
that courts weigh the severity of the law’s burden against a narrowly tailored
governmental interest.66 As the court in New York State Rifle & Pistol
Associations v. Cuomo explained, courts will define a regulation as a severe
burden when a regulation fails to leave open ample alternative channels.67
For example, the court in Decastro recognized that although the New York
law prohibiting anyone except for licensed importers from transporting
firearms burdened citizens’ Second Amendment right, the law left ample
alternative means of possessing a firearm.68 For a regulation to survive strict
scrutiny, the regulation must be narrowly tailored.69 A narrowly tailored
government has the burden of showing there is a reasonable fit, not perfect fit, between
the challenged regulation and a substantial governmental interest).
62. See United States v. Masciandro, 638 F.3d 458, 474 (4th Cir. 2011)
(acknowledging the fit of the law’s burden need not be perfect, rather, a reasonable fit to
the governmental interest).
63. See Chester, 628 F.3d at 683 (banning domestic violence misdemeanants right
to possess firearms).
64. See United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 805 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting the law
placed a blanket ban only on all individuals convicted of domestic violence
misdemeanors).
65. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628-29 (2008) (explaining the
Second Amendment applies strictly to only law-abiding, responsible citizens).
66. See United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining
how courts should determine the appropriate level of scrutiny using the First Amendment
framework).
67. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 990 F. Supp. 2d. 349, 367
(W.D.N.Y. 2013) (specifying laws cannot place a complete, blanket ban on firearms but
must leave open alternative channels).
68. See United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 168 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding the
regulation left open alternative means of firearm possession and thus was constitutional).
69. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 707 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that the
strength of the governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of the actual burden on
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restriction “requires that the regulation actually advance the compelling
interest it is designed to serve.”70 For example, the Marzzarella court held
that the law prohibiting firearms with obliterated serial numbers survived
strict scrutiny because the law was narrowly tailored to serve the interest of
tracing firearms by prohibiting possession of untraceable firearms.71
III. ANALYSIS

A. When Selecting the Appropriate Level of Scrutiny For Second
Amendment Claims, Courts Should Adopt the First Amendment Framework
Because the Second Amendment Is Subject to a One-Size-Fits-All Level of
Scrutiny.
1. Courts Should Use the First Amendment As a Guide When Analyzing
Second Amendment Claims.
As the Heller court failed to establish the appropriate framework for
Second Amendment claims, courts now look towards the First Amendment
for guidance.72 When determining the applicable framework for First
Amendment cases, courts must first determine how close the regulation or
restriction comes to the core of an individual’s fundamental right.73 For
example, the Heller court acknowledged that some federal gun laws and
regulations ultimately survive analysis because they regulate activity outside
of the Second Amendment’s intended scope.74 However, if the government
cannot establish that the regulated activity falls outside the scope, judicial
review will depend on how close the law comes to the core of the
amendment’s guaranteed right and the severity of the burden on that right.75

the Amendment).
70. See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 100 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining
that a law that burdens a significant amount of protected conduct while not implicating
the government interest is evidence that a regulation is insufficiently tailored).
71. See id. at 99-101 (arguing obliterated serial numbers on firearms lead to
untraceable firearms, thus prohibiting obliterated serial numbers allows the government
to properly track the firearms).
72. See United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013) (recognizing
that the two frameworks are similar because of the similarities between the scope and
context of the First Amendment and the Second Amendment).
73. See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138 (stating courts focus on how the law burdens the
core of the Second Amendment right and the severity of such burden).
74. See Ezell, 651 F.3d 702-03 (noting that if the law falls outside the scope of the
Second Amendment, the analysis ends; therefore, the regulated activity is unprotected).
75. See generally id. (asserting that if the government cannot establish the law is
unprotected, then the second inquiry is how close the law comes to the core of the Second
Amendment right).
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Just as other constitutional rights can adopt a one-size-fits-all standard of
review, so can the Second Amendment.76 Using the framework carved out
by courts analyzing First Amendment challenges, the level of scrutiny in a
Second Amendment context should likewise depend on: (1) how close the
law comes to the core of the Second Amendment right, and (2) the severity
of the law’s burden on the right.77 In effect, the Second Amendment can
extrapolate the First Amendment’s framework by concluding that a severe
burden on the Second Amendment will require a strong public interest
justification while laws merely regulating, not restricting, may be more
easily justified.78
2. Assembly Bill 1014 Does Not Severely Burden an Individual’s Right to
Bear Arms Because the Bill Does Not Apply to Responsible, Law-Abiding
Citizens; therefore, Courts Should Apply Intermediate Scrutiny.
As the Second Amendment jurisprudence has not yet drawn the important
distinctions between the application of intermediate and strict scrutiny based
on the restriction’s target, many courts rightfully look towards First
Amendment analysis and jurisprudence for guidance.79 For example, the
court in Ezell followed the First Amendment to determine the appropriate
level of scrutiny to analyze Chicago’s ordinance banning all firing ranges in
the city.80 The court analogized election law cases where laws imposing
severe burdens apply strict scrutiny, whereas “more modest regulatory
measures need only be reasonable, politically neutral, and justified by an

76. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010) (explaining that
Second Amendment regulations impose varying degrees of burden on individual
assertions of the right; thus, susceptible to a one-size-fits-all standard of review by using
the framework of other fundamental rights analysis).
77. See id. at 682; Ezell, 651 F.3d at 703 (establishing the framework courts should
apply to Second Amendment challenges).
78. See Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708 (demonstrating the different levels of scrutiny in First
Amendment jurisprudence using commercial-speech cases as an example; specifically
explaining that courts apply intermediate scrutiny to review the subordinate position that
commercial speech occupies in the scale of the First Amendment values).
79. See generally District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)
(explaining that the First Amendment contains the right of freedom-of-speech that
includes specific exceptions for speech outside its scope, and the Second Amendment is
no different).
80. Compare Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708 (highlighting in First Amendment
jurisprudence, focusing on public benefits, courts will apply intermediate scrutiny after
noting that restrictions in adult bookstores have public benefits justifying any curtailment
of speech), with Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 786 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that
when analyzing election laws, courts will apply strict scrutiny only where the right to
vote is subjected to “severe restrictions”).
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important governmental interest.”81 It follows that California’s Assembly
Bill 1014 should be analyzed by critics and analysts under the First
Amendment jurisprudence to determine the appropriate framework and level
of scrutiny.82 Under First Amendment analysis, unlike the regulation in Ezell
that placed a blanket ban on firearm activity or firearm possession, Assembly
Bill 1014 modestly regulates gun possession for a period not to exceed oneyear.83 Further, Assembly Bill 1014 does not come into effect unless there
is probable cause, supported later by clear and convincing evidence, to
believe one is a risk to himself or others.84 Therefore, the bill does not
regulate an individual’s firearm possession unless he or she is proven to be
a dangerous individual.85 In effect, because Assembly Bill 1014 merely
places a moderate, temporary burden on only a dangerous, irresponsible
individual’s Second Amendment right, the First Amendment jurisprudence
analysis points toward applying intermediate scrutiny.86 Essentially, because
the strength of the government interest must reflect the seriousness of the
actual, modern burden on the constitutional right, applying intermediate
scrutiny, rather than strict, is justified.87 Because Assembly Bill 1014 aims
at serving the governmental interest of preventing mass shootings, suicides,
and other tragedies while placing a moderate burden on an individual’s
Second Amendment right, intermediate scrutiny should be applied.88
When reviewing and analyzing different degrees of scrutiny under the
Second Amendment, courts generally recognize that the Second Amendment

81. See Ezell, 651 F.3d at 707 (noting many courts have said that First Amendment
framework is analogous for Second Amendment claims).
82. See id. at 708 (stating that courts can distill the First Amendment doctrine and
extrapolate a few general principles applicable to the Second Amendment context).
83. See A.B. 1014 Gen. Assemb., 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (stressing that
if one poses a significant risk of personal injury, law enforcement can retain the person’s
firearms for a period not exceeding one year).
84. See id. (emphasizing that Assembly Bill does not target law-abiding, responsible
citizens, rather, only dangerous individuals).
85. See id. (targeting only those individuals who demonstrate a propensity to
commit violence toward themselves or others).
86. See generally id. §§ 18175(b)(1), 18185(b)(noting there is a high burden to
prove that an individual’s firearms should be restrained).
87. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703-08 (7th Cir. 2011) (applying
intermediate scrutiny requires a court to measure the burden the law places on an
individual’s right and whether the burden is tailored to an important governmental
interest).
88. Ian Lovett, California Will Allow Family Members to Seek Seizure of Guns, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 30, 2014), http://wwww.nytimes.com/2014/10/01/us/california-will-allowfamily-members-to-seek-seizure-of-guns.html (stressing Assembly Bill 1014 allows
family members to intervene before a shooting tragedy occurs).
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is susceptible to a one-size-fits-all standard of fundamental right review.89
In Chester, the court examined the constitutionality of a West Virginia law,
which banned those convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors from
possessing firearms.90 Using the First Amendment framework, the court
stated that the level of scrutiny depends on the nature of the regulated
conduct and the degree of which the law burdens a law-abiding, responsible
right.91 Specifically, a court should also acknowledge that as in First
Amendment jurisprudence, content-neutral time, place, and manner
regulations should trigger intermediate scrutiny.92 A court examining
Assembly Bill 1014 should analogize the bill to Chester because the bill in
question also regulates a non-law-abiding citizen.93 Similar to the law in
Chester, California’s Assembly Bill 1014 strictly targets regulating
irresponsible, dangerous individuals.94 As the law in Chester applies to
convicted domestic violence misdemeanants,95 Assembly Bill 1014 similarly
targets only dangerous individuals who, like domestic violence
misdemeanants, prove to be a threat to themselves or others.96 Thus, guided
by the First Amendment framework, courts should employ intermediate
scrutiny when analyzing Assembly Bill 1014 because the bill reasonably
restricts the manner in which only dangerous individuals may possess
89. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010) (explaining guncontrol regulations impose varying degrees of burdens on Second Amendment rights;
thus, similar to other constitutional rights, the Second Amendment is susceptible to a
one-size-fits all standard of review (citing United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 81314 (7th Cir. 2009).
90. Id. at 677-78 (explaining that the lower court compared the law to lawful
regulations, such as longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons, in
finding the restriction a lawful exercise of governmental regulation).
91. See id. at 682 (exemplifying that content-based speech restrictions on
noncommercial speech must satisfy strict scrutiny).
92. Id.; see also Skoien, 587 F.3d at 813-14 (emphasizing that laws may be more
easily justified if they merely regulate rather than restrict, and that laws posing modest
burdens on a right may be more easily justified).
93. See Chester, 628 F.3d at 683 (holding because the appellant was not a lawabiding citizen that the law regulating the manner of gun possession called for
intermediate scrutiny).
94. See A.B. 1014, Gen. Assemb., 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (stressing that
Assembly Bill 1014 establishes a procedure to obtain a gun violence restraining order
and seizure warrant when a person poses a significant risk of personal injury to
themselves or others).
95. See Chester, 628 F.3d at 677 (stating Congress aimed at keeping firearms out of
the hands of dangerous misdemeanants).
96. See Cal. A.B. 1014 § 18155(b) (highlighting that magistrates should look
towards recent threats, acts of violence towards the named person and others, reckless
use or display of firearms, and attempted threat or threatened use of physical force).
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firearms.97
A court examining Assembly Bill 1014 should also look to the court’s
First Amendment analysis in Skoien for direction.98 Similar to Chester, the
appellant in Skoien challenged state law, which placed a blanket ban on
firearm possession on those convicted of a domestic-violence
misdemeanor.99 Essentially, a court should also look to the First Amendment
jurisprudence and recognize that levels of scrutiny fluctuate with the
character and degree of a challenged law’s burden on the right.100
Specifically, because the law merely regulates rather than places a blanket
ban, or wholly restricts firearm possession, intermediate scrutiny should
apply.101 Because the appellant was a convicted domestic violence
misdemeanant, the court compared the appellant to a convicted felon,
holding that the appellant was not a law-abiding, responsible citizen, and
thus applied intermediate scrutiny.102 Similar to the regulation in Skoien,
California’s Assembly Bill 1014 aims at unarming dangerous individuals;
though the restricted individuals are not formally convicted of a crime, they
are still considered irresponsible citizens because they have proven a
propensity to commit violence.103
California’s Assembly Bill 1014 does not place a blanket ban on any and
everyone’s firearm possession, rather, the bill regulates an irresponsible,
dangerous person’s possession for a short one-year period.104 Further, to
even potentially regulate an individual, a court must provide clear and
convincing evidence that an individual is a danger to themselves or others.105
97. See generally Cal. A.B. 1014.
98. See United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 804 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting dispute

arose over misdemeanant’s shotgun possession).
99. See id. at 805 (noting the dispute arose over a convicted domestic violence
misdemeanant’s possession of a shotgun).
100. Id. at 813 (recognizing the fluctuating differences between various types of
speech protections under the First Amendment).
101. See id. (stating that laws that merely regulate, rather than completely restrict and
implicate, the central self-defense concern of the Second Amendment, should use
intermediate scrutiny).
102. See id. at 810, 814 (stressing intermediate scrutiny is appropriate because the
appellant’s challenge does not implicate the core Second Amendment right of armed
self-defense implicated in Heller).
103. Compare Skoien, 587 F.3d at 805 (restraining irresponsible, convicted domestic
violence misdemeanants from possessing a firearm), with A.B. 1014, Gen. Assemb.,
2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (underlining the high burden the government must
show to prove an individual is a significant risk of injury to themselves or others).
104. Cal. A.B. 1014 (emphasizing the period shall not exceed one year).
105. See id. (specifying the state has a high burden of proof when arguing a
magistrate shall grant a gun violence restraining order and firearm seizure warrant).
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Moreover, the court must hold a hearing to determine if a person is truly a
threat to themselves or others.106 Because California’s Assembly Bill 1014
simply regulates, rather than places a blanket ban or wholly restricts,
dangerous individual’s possession of firearms, courts should apply
intermediate scrutiny.107
B. Assembly Bill 1014 Passes Intermediate Scrutiny Because the Bill
Reasonably Regulates the Time and Manner in Which Dangerous,
Threatening People Possess Firearms, Thus Aiming to Serve the
Government’s Compelling Interest in Preventing Gun Violence and Mass
Shootings.
For a Second Amendment claim to survive intermediate scrutiny, the law
must state an important governmental interest and support a fit between the
challenged regulation and asserted objective.108 As discussed above, the
court in Chovan applied intermediate scrutiny to California’s law that barred
persons convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence crimes from
possessing any firearms.109 Under intermediate scrutiny, the government
stressed its important interest in preventing gun violence by detaining
firearms from those who will most likely misuse them. 110 Further, the
government argued it’s interest in preventing domestic gun violence
altogether.111 A court analyzing Assembly Bill 1014 should draw from the
Chovan court’s analysis and hold that the law survives intermediate scrutiny
for numerous reasons; however, most importantly, because the law sought to
reach the people not merely based on their status as convicted felons, but
those who demonstrated violence and irresponsibility.112

106. See id. (stressing if the state does not establish clear and convincing evidence
that the named person is a threat to themselves or others, the seized firearms should be
returned to the named person).
107. See id. (targeting only individuals that prove to possess a propensity of violence
and are a significant threat of physical injury to themselves or others); see e.g., N.Y. State
Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 990 F. Supp. 2d 349, 356-57 (W.D.N.Y. 2013)
(regulating the amount of magazines an individual can purchase).
108. See generally United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1139 (9th Cir. 2011)
(stressing the fit must not be perfect, but rather, reasonable).
109. See id. at 1138 (using the First Amendment framework to establish the burden
the statute placed on a domestic violence misdemeanant’s Second Amendment right).
110. See id. at 1139 (arguing that the law advances the important governmental
interest of preventing gun violence in general by banning possession by irresponsible
individuals).
111. See id. (finding that the assembly bill reasonably fits the government’s important
governmental interest, thus surviving intermediate scrutiny).
112. Id. at 1140 (holding that keeping guns from domestic violence misdemeanants
is substantially related to the broader interest of preventing domestic gun violence and,
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Similar to the law in Chovan, which served the important governmental
interest of reducing domestic violence and gun violence, the government in
California’s Assembly Bill 1014 similarly seeks to keep guns out of the
hands of unpredictable, violent individuals.113 Thus, California’s Assembly
Bill 1014 is analogous to the law in Chovan by aiming at keeping firearms
out of the hands of those who will most likely misuse them.114 In particular,
Assembly Bill 1014 is designed to further achieve the governmental interest
by allowing concerned immediate family members to intervene and
potentially prohibit firearm possession in an attempt to prevent tragedies
such as the Isla Vista shooting.115 There are currently no California laws that
provide a mechanism to limit firearm access to an individual who seeks,
needs, or receives mental health services.116 Assembly Bill 1014 aims to fill
this gap by attempting to prevent tragedies stemming from gun violence and
mass shootings.117 Similar to the law in Chovan, as the bill only targets
violent individuals who prove themselves as risks, Assembly Bill 1014
provides a reasonable fit to the government’s objective of preventing gun
violence, and thus survives intermediate scrutiny.118
therefore, survives intermediate scrutiny). But see United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d
673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010) (highlighting that scholars disagree to the extent to which felons,
let alone misdemeanants, were considered excluded from the right to bear arms).
113. See generally A.B. 1014, Gen. Assemb., 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014)
(targeting only those who are a significant risk of injury to themselves or others); see
also Mason, supra note 13 (noting that the state proposal borrows heavily from existing
state laws pertaining to domestic violence intended to protect victims).
114. See Cal. A.B. 1014 (aiming to restrain those who are a risk of injury to
themselves or others from using firearms).
115. See id. § 18150(a)(1) (noting that an “immediate family” means any “spouse,
parent, child, any person related by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree,
or any other person who regularly resides in the household, or who, within the prior six
months, regularly resided in the household.”); see also Press Release, Cal. State
Assembly, Assembly Members Nancy Skinner, Das Williams Announce Legislation in
Wake of Santa Barbara Shooting (May 27, 2014) (on file with author) (arguing that
parents who try to intervene, like Rodger’s mother, deserve an effective tool to help
prevent tragedies).
116. See Press Release, Cal. State Assembly, supra note 115 (noting that existing law
only prohibits firearm purchase, sale, or possession for those under domestic violence
protective orders).
117. See id. (criticizing current legislation and stating that because Rodger neither
committed a crime nor met the criteria for involuntary treatment, the purchase and
possession of firearms remained unpreventable).
118. Compare United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1139 (9th Cir. 2013)
(emphasizing that Congress sought to close the dangerous loophole by establishing a
policy of zero gun violence tolerance and passing a law strictly to prevent domestic gun
violence), with Press Release, Cal. State Assembly, supra note 115 (highlighting that the
bill fits the government’s objective because when an individual is in a crisis the people
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Although when analyzing a claim under intermediate scrutiny the
government must establish a fit between a statute’s means and its end, the fit
need not be perfect, but rather, only reasonable.119 The court in Chester
acknowledged the reasonable fit standard while analyzing a West Virginia’s
law barring domestic violence misdemeanants under intermediate
scrutiny.120 Although the court recognized the government’s offer to show
why the disarmament of domestic violence misdemeanants substantially
relates to an important governmental goal, the court concluded that the
government did not offer sufficient evidence to establish a relationship
between the statute and its stated goal.121 Unlike the government in Chester,
California’s Assembly Bill 1014 establishes a reasonable, in fact, almost
perfect fit between the government’s important interest and a regulation.122
In particular, California’s Assembly Bill 1014 establishes a procedure to
keep firearms out of the hands of the main problem: potentially dangerous,
threatening, and violent individuals.123 Assemblywoman Nancy Skinner
introduced the bill in response to the UCSB shooting, stating that parents
such as Rodger’s deserve an effective tool that they can utilize to help
prevent such tragedies.124
In Rodger’s situation, Rodger’s mother
recognized that her son was a dangerous, violent, and threatening individual
and she attempted, but failed, to intervene.125 California’s Assembly Bill
closest to him or her can spot the warning signs and prevent him or her from buying or
possessing a firearm).
119. See generally Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011)
(stressing the law need not be the best disposition but the scope is proportional to the
interest).
120. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 677-83 (4th Cir. 2010) (stressing
courts will not apply strict scrutiny whenever a law impinges upon a right specifically
enumerated in the Bill of Rights).
121. Id. at 683 (holding that the restriction did not survive intermediate scrutiny
because the government failed to establish a reasonable fit between the important object
of reducing domestic gun violence and the statute’s permanent disbarment of all
domestic violence misdemeanants).
122. See Press Release, Cal. State Assembly, supra note 115 (explaining that family
members can intervene and prevent mass shootings and future tragedies).
123. See generally A.B. 1014, Gen. Assemb., 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014)
(establishing a procedure to obtain a gun violence restraining order and a firearm seizure
warrant when a person poses a significant risk of personal injury to himself or others).
124. Id. (stressing the bill allows use of information brought forth by relatives or
friends to determine eligibility for a gun violence restraining order); see also Press
Release, Cal. State Assembly, supra note 115 (noting that currently there is nothing to
prevent a threatening individual from purchasing or possessing firearms, but tragedies
create opportunities for legislators to reform proposals).
125. See generally Cal. A.B. 1014 § 18150(a) (allowing parents to bring forward
claims of individuals who pose a significant risk of injury to themselves or others); see
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1014 would provide parents, such as Rodger’s mother, with the opportunity
to seek help from the court.126 California’s Assembly Bill 1014 serves to
prevent gun violence and tragic mass-shootings, demonstrating that the bill
is reasonably tailored and ultimately survives intermediate scrutiny.127
To survive intermediate scrutiny, courts rely on substantial evidence that
fairly supports the government’s rationale in passing the law.128 For
example, the government in Cuomo had the burden of establishing that New
York had a substantial interest in public safety and crime prevention to
uphold its ban on assault weapons referred to in the SAFE Act.129 In finding
that the statute survived intermediate scrutiny, the court recognized New
York’s exhaustive study of shootings in America, citing mass shootings in
the last thirty years where shooters used assault weapons.130 Similar to New
York’s SAFE Act, California’s Assembly Bill 1014, stemming from the
proliferation of mass shootings in the last decade, aims to prevent mass
shootings by keeping weapons out of dangerous hands.131 California’s
Assembly Bill 1014 compares to New York’s SAFE Act because the bill
narrowly focuses on gun violence prevention by intervening during a critical
psychological period by restricting access to firearms.132 The bill encourages
concerned family members to warn law enforcement of dangerous
individuals, and thus it aims to prevent gun violence by keeping firearms out
of the hands of dangerous individuals.133 Because California’s Assembly
also Mason, supra note 13 (stating Rodger’s mother contacted mental health
professionals regarding her son’s conditions, but they could not remove his firearms).
126. Mason, supra note 13 (noting that people deserve an effective tool they can act
on to help prevent these types of tragedies).
127. See generally Cal. A.B. 1014 (stating if a magistrate finds probable cause to
believe the named individual is dangerous or a significant risk to others, the magistrate
shall issue both a firearm seizure warrant and a gun violence restraining order).
128. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 990 F. Supp. 2d. 349, 368
(W.D.N.Y. 2013) (analyzing whether New York provided substantial evidence to
support their ban on assault weapons).
129. See generally id. (noting New York had to prove evidence without deference
that supports their rationale for their ban).
130. Id. at 371 (finding that New York satisfied its burden to demonstrate a
substantial link between the regulation and the compelling interest of public safety it
sought to advance).
131. Compare id. (finding that New York satisfied its burden by demonstrating a
substantial link, based on reasonably relevant evidence, between the SAFE Act’s
regulation of assault weapons and compelling interest of public safety), with Cal. A.B.
1014 (emerging from the Santa Barbara shooting and serving the compelling interest of
preventing gun violence).
132. See generally Cal. A.B. 1014 (going beyond federal standards to keep firearms
out of the hands of threatening, dangerous individuals).
133. See id. (explaining a gun violence restraining order prohibits a named person
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Bill 1014 serves the important, compelling governmental interest of
preventing mass shootings and is reasonably tailored to keep firearms out of
dangerous hands, Assembly Bill 1014 survives intermediate scrutiny.134
C. Not Only Does California’s Assembly Bill 1014 Satisfy Intermediate
Scrutiny, But the Bill Also Survives Strict Scrutiny Because the Bill
Narrowly Restricts Dangerous Citizens Aiming to Serve the Compelling
Governmental Interest to Prevent Gun Violence and Mass Shootings.
Courts should review Second Amendment claims under strict scrutiny
only when a restriction creates a substantial burden and significantly
interferes with the ability of a law-abiding, responsible citizens possession
and use of firearms for self-defense.135 A restriction creates a substantial
burden when it burdens a protected interest un-proportionally to the statute’s
asserted governmental interest.136 In Heller, the District of Columbia
enforced a blanket handgun ban ultimately prohibiting the possession and
registration of handguns.137 Further, the District of Columbia required that
residents keep any lawfully obtained firearms unloaded and dissembled.138
Consequentially, the law at issue completely banned handgun possession in
the home, and in effect, placed a blanket prohibition on an entire class of
firearms.139 Scholars and politicians heavily criticized the law because the
prohibition extended to the home, where the need for self-defense of property

from having under his or her custody and control, owning, purchasing, possessing, or
receiving firearms).
134. See Carissa Quiambao, Gun Control Bill Moves Through State Senate, DAILY
NEXUS (July 1, 2014), http://dailynexus.com/2014-07-01/gun-control-bill-movesthrough-state-senate/ (stressing Assembly Bill 1014 aims at preventing an incident such
as the Isla Vista shooting).
135. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008) (stressing courts
should only use strict scrutiny when a statute burdens an interest in such a way that is out
of proportion to the salutary effects upon other governmental interests); see also id. at
688 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (clarifying that rational-basis cannot be used for Second
Amendment cases because the laws which seek to prevent gun violence bear at least a
“rational relationship” to a “legitimate” governmental objective).
136. Heller, 554 U.S. at 634; see also Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 786 (9th Cir.
2011) (declaring strict scrutiny necessary when laws significantly interfere with a
fundamental right).
137. Heller, 554 U.S. at 574-75 (noting the District of Columbia prohibited
registration of handguns and possession of unregistered handguns outlawed the
possession of any handgun).
138. See id. at 575 (providing that firearms do not need to be unloaded and
dissembled when located in a place of business or used for recreational activities).
139. Id. at 576 (stressing that the type of firearm restricted is mostly used for lawful
purposes).
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and family is imperative.140 Although the Court acknowledged the Second
Amendment’s limitations, the Court also recognized that the law protects the
fundamental right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense
of hearth and home.141 The Court explained that under any level of scrutiny,
an ultimate ban of handguns142 would fail constitutional analysis.143 A law
restricting the possession of all firearms in all homes for any law-abiding
citizen would surely fail any level of scrutiny, therefore, Assembly Bill 1014
contrasts the burden in Heller.144 Unlike the law in Heller, California’s
Assembly Bill 1014 narrowly targets and only applies to irresponsible,
violent individuals rather than applying to all law-abiding, responsible
citizens like Heller.145 Further, rather than placing a complete blanket
prohibition on firearms like the law in Heller, Assembly Bill 1014 only
temporarily seizes a potentially dangerous individual’s firearms for a time
not exceeding one year.146 Additionally, Assembly Bill 1014 provides
individuals a safeguard by requiring a hearing to determine whether one
poses a significant risk to themselves or others before restraining one’s
firearms.147
Critics may argue Assembly Bill 1014 is unconstitutional because the bill
removes the ability for an individual to possess firearms in the home — a
critical, acute area for self-defense.148 However, interpreting the Second
Amendment precedent in such a way would ignore a crucial factor in the
140. Id. at 628 (noting protection of the home, property, and family is most acute).
141. Id. at 635; see also Ezell v. City of Chi., 651 F.3d 684, 701 (7th Cir. 2011)

(stating the court in Heller established the inherent right of self-defense is central to the
Second Amendment right).
142. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29 (underlining the ban prohibits the nation’s
preferred firearm, handguns, to protect the home).
143. Id. at 629 (emphasizing that few laws in the nation’s history came close to the
severe restrictions, such as the District of Columbia’s blanket ban on handguns).
144. See id. at 635 (stressing the District’s law as unconstitutional because the law
infringed the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense).
145. Compare id. (emphasizing that the law placed an unconstitutionally blanket
prohibition on law-abiding, responsible citizens’ handgun possession), with Cal. A.B.
1014 (targeting only persons who are proven to be irresponsible, dangerous, and a threat
to themselves or others).
146. See Cal. A.B. 1014 (asserting that a person’s firearms may be seized for a period
not to exceed one year; however, after one year, if the person is still a threat to others,
the seizure may be renewed for a second year).
147. See generally id. (requiring a hearing, after a temporary restraining order has
been issued, where the state must prove by clear and convincing evidence that an
individual poses a significant risk to themselves or others).
148. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 (emphasizing the home is where the need for selfdefense, property, and family is most acute and banning firearms from the home would
fail any constitutional muster).
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analysis – namely, the Second Amendment applies to only law-abiding,
responsible citizens.149 Assembly Bill 1014 does not infringe on the rights
of the every day, average, responsible citizens; rather, the bill strictly focuses
on irresponsible individuals who prove by clear and convincing evidence a
propensity for violence and a threat to themselves or others.150 Accordingly,
because California’s Assembly Bill 1014 does not infringe on a responsible
citizen’s fundamental right to possess firearms for self-defense, and does not
wholly regulate an average citizen’s right to bear arms, Assembly Bill 1014
also survives strict scrutiny analysis.151
Additionally, courts agree that only regulations substantially burdening
the right to keep and bear arms trigger heightened, strict scrutiny.152 In
Decastro, the appellant argued a New York law prohibiting anyone other
than licensed importers or dealers from transporting a firearm purchased or
obtained outside that state into the state violates his Second Amendment
right.153 To analyze whether such burden impinged on the appellant’s right
to bear arms, the court evaluated the reasonableness of the regulation and
whether the regulation left open ample alternative channels to obtain a
firearm.154 A court analyzing Assembly Bill 1014 will also likely consider
these factors.155 A court should draw from the Decastro court’s reasoning
when analyzing Assembly Bill 1014 and declare that the law does not burden
an individual’s Second Amendment right because it burdens one’s ability to
purchase a firearm in his or her own state for only one year, and therefore,
the bill provides ample alternatives for firearm possession.156

149. Id. at 635 (stressing the Second Amendment protects the interests of lawabiding, responsible citizens); see also Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th
Cir. 2011) (criticizing Chicago’s regulation because it encroaches and prohibits lawabiding, responsible citizens from engaging in their Second Amendment rights).
150. Cal. A.B. 1014 (stating if a person poses a significant risk of personal injury to
himself or herself or others by possessing a firearm, the bill would require law
enforcement to retain the firearm).
151. See id. (explaining that the inherent right of self-defense for law-abiding citizens
is central to the Second Amendment).
152. See United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 166 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting a severe
burden on the core amendment right will require an extremely strong public-interest
justification).
153. Id. at 163 (specifying the appellant purchased a firearm in Florida and
knowingly transported the pistol to New York without applying for a license to possess
a firearm in New York).
154. See id. at 168; see also Silvester v. Harris, No. 1:11-CV-2137 AWI SAB, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172946, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2013) (stating that a regulation is
subject to strict scrutiny when the regulation threatens a core Second Amendment right).
155. See Cal. A.B. 1014.
156. Decastro, 682 F.3d at 168 (emphasizing that one’s residence is the most
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As the New York state transporting law in Decastro provided adequate
alternatives for firearm possession, California’s Assembly Bill 1014 also
provides these same alternatives.157 Critics may argue Assembly Bill 1014
completely seizes an individual’s firearms, thus, the bill places a blanket ban
on firearm possession.158 However, such argument is flawed because the bill
requires that the firearms be only temporarily seized until one can present
their case to a magistrate.159 Similar to the law in Decastro, Assembly Bill
1014 does not completely prohibit possession of firearms; rather, the law
places a strict regulation on firearms from violent, dangerous citizens for a
temporary period no longer than one year.160 Moreover, at the hearing after
firearm seizure, the state must meet the heightened burden of proof;
however, if the court finds that the state does not meet its burden, the
individual may regain his or her firearms.161 Assembly Bill 1014 satisfies
strict scrutiny because it requires a hearing before temporarily seizing the
firearms, does not place a blanket ban on any and all firearm possession, and
allows for ample alternatives for responsible, law-abiding individuals to
possess firearms.162
For a regulation to pass a Second Amendment analysis under strict
scrutiny, the regulation must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.163 In Marzzarella, the appellant argued that his conviction under a
Pennsylvania law prohibiting handguns with obliterated serial numbers

convenient place to purchase a firearm).
157. Cal. A.B. 1014 (stating the existing law requires police officers to only take
temporary custody of an individual’s firearms).
158. Abigail Wilkinson, CA Bill Would Allow Secret Seizure of Firearms Based on
Just
One
Complaint,
CNS
NEWS
(July
10,
2014),
http://cnsnews.com/news/article/abigail-wilkinson/ca-bill-would-allow-secret-seizurefirearms-based-just-one-complaint (stressing the National Rifle Association claims the
bill is one of the most egregious violations of civil liberties ever introduced).
159. See Cal. A.B. 1014 (emphasizing that at a hearing the magistrate should
determine the grounds for a gun violence restraining order and determine if the firearms
should be seized).
160. Compare Decastro, 682 F.3d at 167 (noting laws that place reasonable time,
manner, and place restrictions that leave ample alternatives as constitutional), with Cal.
A.B. 1014 (requiring a hearing allows for built in due process to determine whether there
is probable cause to issue a firearm seizure for no longer than one year).
161. See generally Cal. A.B. 1014 (stressing if the named person is not a risk or if the
court finds that the state has not met the required standard of proof, the firearms must be
returned to the named person).
162. See id. (noting that the state has the burden of proving that the individual poses
a significant risk of safety to himself, herself or to others).
163. See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85,99-100 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining
that a law must be the least-restrictive method of serving that interest).
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violated his right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment.164
The court specified that at its core, the Second Amendment protects the right
of law-abiding, responsible citizens to possess non-dangerous weapons for
self-defense for lawful purposes.165 For a law to pass muster under strict
scrutiny, the court noted that the law must be narrowly tailored towards a
compelling governmental interest in which it is designed to serve.166 The
court explained that the state statute protected the governmental interest of
tracing firearms because it discouraged possession and use of firearms that
are harder or impossible to trace.167 The court held that the statute was
narrowly tailored, and therefore, passed under either intermediate or strict
scrutiny.168 Similar to the law in Marzzarella, California’s Assembly Bill
1014 is narrowly tailored to support a compelling governmental interest.169
Like the law in Marzzarella, prohibiting possession of firearms without
serial numbers narrowly tailored the government’s interest of tracing
firearms, California’s Assembly Bill 1014 sets forth a detailed procedure
specifically and narrowly targeting only dangerous individuals.170 Assembly
Bill 1014 does not place a blanket ban on all individuals; rather, the bill
narrowly aims at seizing firearms from only those who are proven as a
significant threat to themselves or others.171 Further, Assembly Bill 1014
does not allow officials to restrict anyone’s firearms at their discretion, but
rather, the bill requires the state to use sufficient evidence to prove that the
164. Id. at 88 (stating the law is designed to regulate the commercial sale of firearms
and to prevent possession by a class of presumptively dangerous individuals).
165. Id. at 92 (stressing that all possession for any purpose is not protected by the
Second Amendment); see also United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 466 (4th Cir.
2011) (noting that the Second Amendment right, parallel to the First Amendment right,
is not unlimited and does not protect the right to keep any weapon in any manner for any
purpose).
166. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 100 (explaining that a law must be the leastrestrictive method of serving that interest).
167. Id. at 98-101 (emphasizing because firearm serial numbers assist law
enforcement in gathering vital information the statute serves a compelling government
interest).
168. Id. at 101 (stressing the law protects the compelling interest of tracing firearms
by discouraging the possession and use of firearms that are harder or impossible to trace).
169. See Cal. A.B. 1014.
170. Compare Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 101 (stressing that the statute protects the
compelling narrow interest of tracing firearms by discouraging possession and use of
firearms that are impossible to trace), with Cal. A.B. 1014 (seizing firearms from those
who prove a significant risk of injury to themselves or others to further protect against
gun violence and mass shootings of notably dangerous individuals).
171. See generally Cal. A.B. 1014 (preventing irresponsible, dangerous individuals
from possessing or purchasing firearms during a crucial psychological period to avert
gun violence and mass shootings).
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named person poses a significant risk of bodily harm to himself, herself, or
to others.172 Most importantly, Assembly Bill 1014 establishes this
procedure specifically to deter and prevent gun violence and mass shootings
in light of the recent Isla Vista shooting.173 Accordingly, California’s
Assembly Bill 1014 undoubtedly survives heightened strict scrutiny.174
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
As mass shootings continue to devastate our nation, Congress responds by
proposing stricter gun regulations in attempts to prevent such tragedies.175
With Assembly Bill 1014, “California goes beyond the federal standard to
keep guns out of the hands of dangerous individuals.”176 Studies reveal that
factors leading to gun violence include, “a history of violent crime,
perpetration of domestic violence, and drug and alcohol abuse.”177
California’s Assembly Bill 1014 suggests past violence is the best predictor
of future violence and acts as an effective policy at both a state and federal
level.178 Instituting an order such as Assembly Bill 1014 nationwide, or even
state-to-state, would allow for interventions during critical times when a
person has the potential to be extremely dangerous.179

172. Id. (stressing the magistrate must consider an array of evidence, concluding the
state met proof beyond a reasonable doubt, before issuing a gun violence restraining
order and a firearm seizure warrant).
173. Press Release, Cal. State Assembly, supra note 115 (addressing the tragedies of
the Isla Vista shooting and creating a procedure to issue gun violence restraining orders).
174. See generally Cal. A.B. 1014 (deterring irresponsible, dangerous individuals
from possessing or purchasing firearms); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 706
(7th Cir. 2011) (specifying that Second Amendment scrutiny necessarily means that the
government’s actions must be justified under a heightened standard of judicial review).
175. Chris Dolmetsch & Edvard Petterson, Connecticut Gun Law Passed After Sandy
Hook
Ruled
Legal,
BLOOMBERG
(Jan.
31,
2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-31/connecticut-gun-law-passedafter-sandy-hook-ruled-legal?cmpid=yhoo.) (explaining that Connecticut’s ban on
assault weapons and large-capacity magazines, which arose after the Sandy Hook
shooting, is constitutional).
176. Renee Binder, California Needs a Gun Violence Restraining Order, L.A. TIMES
(May 26, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-binder-rodgers-gunviolence-isla-vista-20140527-story.html (explaining California strengthened its laws by
temporarily banning individual’s guns).
177. See id. (detailing Consortium for Risk-Based Firearm study and arguing that
past violence may also be a predictor for future violence).
178. Id. (explaining that evidence demonstrates that people who have serious mental
illness and are not engaging in necessary treatment may be at an elevated risk of
violence).
179. Id. (explaining that Rodger’s mother voiced her concerns in April, proving that
family members know when a loved one is in crisis and may have access to firearms to
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Over the last few decades, our country has endured countless mass
shooting sprees involving firearms in the hands of mentally disturbed or
dangerous individuals.180 In light of the Isla Vista shooting, many states,
such as California and Connecticut, have revised and tightened specific gun
regulations.181 States should propose regulations similar to California
Assembly Bill 1014 to prevent future acts of violence by keeping guns out
of the hands of dangerous individuals, such as Isla Vista shooter Elliott
Rodger.182 Other states should create such mechanisms, similar to
California’s bill, which would allow those closest – family member, friend,
or even a co-worker – to a troubled individual to act when there are warning
signs or indications that a person is at risk for violence.183 States should push
bills, such as California’s Assembly Bill 1014, centered on mental health to
preserve the nation’s mental health and prevent horrific, gruesome events
such as the Isla Vista mass shooting.184 Not only should states consider such
legislation, but courts should also prepare to face resistance to emerging gun
control by considering and establishing the appropriate level of scrutiny they
will apply to such bills and legislation.185
V. CONCLUSION
Though courts have yet to establish the appropriate level of scrutiny for
do potential harm).
180. Paul Wallin, Should California Adopt a Gun Violence Restraining Order Law,
BEFORE IT’S NEWS (June 27, 2014), http://beforeitsnews.com/crime-allstars/2014/06/should-california-adopt-a-gun-violence-restraining-order-law2449994.html; Kindy, supra note 1, at 2 (noting the father of a victim of the UCSB
shooting stresses Congress needs to act and prevent gun violence).
181. See, e.g., George Lauer, ‘Gun Violence Restraining Order’ Idea May Get
Traction
Experts
Predict,
CAL.
HEALTHLINE
(June
2,
2014),
http://www.californiahealthline.org/insight/2014/gun-violence-restraining-order-ideamay-get-traction-experts-predict (noting after the UCSB shooting, Connecticut Senator
sought to revive gun laws that were proposed after the Newtown shooting).
182. Ellis & Sidner, supra note 2, at 1 (highlighting the day before the shooting,
Rodger posted a YouTube video detailing his “day of retribution” where he would punish
girls); see also Wallin, supra note 180, at 2 (stressing adopting a gun violence restraining
order will protect the public from future tragedies allowing law enforcement to take
action).
183. Lauer, supra note 181, at 1 (supporting California’s Assembly Bill 1014, noting
the idea of giving the people closest to them the ability to intervene and avoid crisis
makes sense).
184. See id. (recognizing that not all gun violence can be prevented by laws but
Congress should attempt to pass legislation to make the country safer).
185. See Peruta v. County of San Diego, 678 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1049 (S.D. Cal. 2010)
(emphasizing that the Heller Court left many lingering questions for future
determination).
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Second Amendment claims, courts continuously and correctly look towards
the First Amendment for guidance.186 Using the First Amendment, courts
should consider how close the law comes to the core of the Second
Amendment right and the severity of the law’s burden on the right.187 As
California’s Assembly Bill 1014 surfaces, critics will surely argue that the
bill fails constitutional muster because it infringes on an individual’s core,
fundamental Second Amendment right to possess a firearm in the home for
self-defense.188 However, despite the reasonable restriction Assembly Bill
1014 places on firearm possession, a close analysis of the bill demonstrates
that it survives both intermediate and strict scrutiny.189 Assembly Bill 1014
aims at keeping weapons out of the hands of the most vulnerable, dangerous
individuals to ultimately prevent mass shootings such as Elliot Rodger’s Isla
Vista shooting.190 Assembly Bill 1014 goes beyond the federal standard of
gun control and takes the first step in the right direction by providing
individuals and law enforcement with a preemptive tool to stop gun violence
and mass tragedies.191

186. See United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2013)
(explaining though Heller did not specify the appropriate level of scrutiny, other circuits
have looked towards the First Amendment as a guide); see also Nordyke v. King, 644
F.3d 776, 786 (9th Cir. 2011) (declaring that regulations trigger strict scrutiny when they
significantly interfere with exercising a fundamental right).
187. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011) (stressing the
rigor of judicial review will depend on how close the law comes to the core and the
severity of burden on the Second Amendment).
188. Quiambao, supra note 134, at 1 (highlighting the President of the California
Association of Federal Firearms Licensees criticizes Assembly Bill 1014 and argues the
Bill violates individuals’ protected, constitutional rights).
189. See generally Cal. A.B. 1014 (arguing that because the procedure of California’s
Assembly Bill 1014 is narrowly tailored to prevent gun violence, Assembly Bill 1014
passes both intermediate and strict scrutiny); see also Quiambao, supra note 134, at 2
(stressing the bill operates within constitutional bounds and preserves an individual’s
right to due process).
190. See Cal. A.B. 1014 (targeting only individuals who are a significant threat of
injury to themselves and others); see also Ellis & Sidner, supra note 2, at 2 (detailing
Rodger’s video where he told the world he would punish girls for not being attracted to
him).
191. See Binder, supra note 176, at 1 (highlighting that California’s law goes beyond
the federal standard to keep guns out of the hands of dangerous individuals).
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